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Research Guide to Export Control and WMD Nonproliferation Law

WEI LUO

∗

INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive
destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and
civilian and military dual-use technologies have been one of the most
important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties
have been signed and the international organizations have been established to
promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized
countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that
possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic
laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and
technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among
these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating
non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dualuse goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated
export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to
the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of
international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research
guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and
domestic export control regimes.
This research guide has two parts. Part One is about the U.S. export
controls and Part Two focuses on International Non-proliferation cooperation
and the export controls of several countries that possess WMD technologies.

∗
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The purpose of this research guide is to guide would-be researchers to the
primary sources (statutes, cases, regulations, and international treaties) and
the websites of major governmental agencies in charge of export controls and
the International organizations promoting non-proliferation. The information
used in Part Two heavily relies on the resources published on the Internet.
PART ONE UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS

The United States' export control system is a highly regulated and
institutionalized system designed to protect its national and international
security interests by regulating which goods and technologies can be
transferred to certain countries. For instance, when an exporter wants to sell a
dual-use product (a product which has both commercial and military
application, i.e., a super-computer system) to a foreign country, she has to
find out whether such a commodity (including hardware, software, and
technical data) can be exported to the country where the entity is located, if
this entity is the end-user of the commodity or is going to re-export the
commodity to another foreign end user, and how to obtain an export license.
If the exporter fails to comply with the law, she may lose export privileges or
subject to fines and/or face imprisonment. Today, posting controlled technical
data on an unsecured website on the Internet could also be treated as violating
the U.S. export control law.
1. FEDERAL STATUTES
Export control law has been essentially a matter of federal law, with
no state law on the subject, because only the federal government has the
power to regulate foreign trade issues. This power was granted by the U.S.
Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3.2
1.1 Dual-Use Goods Export Controls
Before 1940, the United States had no legal mechanism for
controlling peacetime export of militarily significant products to potential
enemies. In 1940, when World War II began, the Congress gave the President
1

Some data listed in Part One of this article were published in Wei Luo, A
Pathfinder to U.S. Export Control Laws and Regulations (Hein, 1994). The author
thanks Hein for allowing reuse of the data in this article.
2
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which reads: “The Congress shall have Power ... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
Indian Tribes.”
448
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authority to control the export of militarily significant goods and technologies
through the Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense.3 By
1949, the West and U.S. viewed the former Soviet Union and its allies,
including the People's Republic of China (PRC) as potential military
adversaries. Accordingly, the Congress enacted the Export Control Act of
1949,4 to give the president the power to impose export controls in order to
further national security and foreign policy objectives, or to preserve goods in
short supply. In 1969, the Congress passed the Export Administration Act of
1969,5 changing the general export control policy from “strategic embargo” to
“qualified promotion of exports”, in order to gain the international exporting
market share for U.S. businesses.
(1) Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979
On September 29, 1979, President Carter signed into law the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (EAA),6 which superseded the EAA of 1969.
Like the previous acts, the EAA of 1979 still empowers the president to
regulate exports of goods and technology from the U.S. in order to protect
national security, further foreign policy, and reserve needed resources.7 In
addition, the EAA authorized the president to establish a list of controlled
countries ranging from those receiving favorable treatment to those whose
imports are severely curtailed.8 Since the enforcement of the EAA needs
highly trained experts to track and regulate dual-use technologies, the
Congress delegated the authority to maintain a Commodity Control List
(CCL) which contains items subject to export restriction, to the Secretary of
Commerce.9
Since the EAA bases its strictures on the country of destination and
the sophistication of the technology to be exported, the EAA can be used to
further U.S. foreign policy goals by manipulating the list of proscribed

3

Ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712 (1940) (expired in 1949).
Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1964)
(expired 1969)).
5
Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2413 (1976) (expired 1979)).
6
Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
7
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
8
50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
9
50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
4
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technologies or countries.10 So, this mechanism of the EAA adds complexity
to the export control system and makes it hard for exporters to follow its laws
and regulations.
The EAA was supposed to expire on September 30, 1990.11 On that
same day, former President Bush issued an executive order to extend the EAA
until the Congress enacted legislation re-authorizing the Act.12 A month later,
the House and Senate both reached agreement on legislation to re-authorize
the EAA on October 23, 1990.13 However, the Congress has never renewed
the EAA since then. Subsequently, the Presidents of the U.S. have annually
issued an executive order to keep the EAA alive by declaring the national
emergency according to the power vested by the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.).14
The IEEPA provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the president has to
publish in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating
that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
Therefore, the president has to do so every year to keep the EAA alive.15
(2) Major Amendments and Additions to the EAA

10

Peter S. Malloy, Controls on the Export of Military Sensitive Technology:
National Security Imperative or U.S. Industry Impediment? 18 Rutgers Computer &
Tech. L.J. 841, 845 (1992).
11
50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1988).
12
Exec. Order No. 12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1991), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
13
Export Controls: House, Senate Conferees Reach Agreement on Legislation to
Extend Export Controls, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1607 (Oct. 24, 1990).
14
Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in Coping with U.S. Export
Controls 2004 21, 23 (PLI, 2004). See also the Executive Orders of Continuation of
Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations issued by the presidents between
1991 and 2005 in Presidential Documents.
15
Continuation of Emergency regarding Export Control Regulations:
Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting Notification that
the Emergency regarding Export Control Regulations Is to Continue in Effect beyond
August 17, 2005, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622(d). Y 1.1/7:109-51 (Washington : U.S.
G.P.O., 2005). This document is also available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_documents& docid=f: hd051.109 (last visited Oct.
7, 2007).
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Even though more than three dozen bills have been introduced to
Congress to reform the EAA, none of them have been passed since 1985.
There have been only four major amendments and additions to the EAA.
1. Export Administration Act of 1985,16 which extended the EAA of
1979 and corrected some of the inefficient export control practices
which could injure national industrial interests.17
2. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,18 which again
amended the EAA in an effort to further ease exporters from the
constraints of overly restrictive export laws by reducing the items on
the commodity control list and simplifying the review procedure of
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Controls (CoCom).19
3. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991,20 which
brings the control of missile technology within the aegis of domestic
export control in order to prevent and suppress the exportation of
technology which may contribute to the proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.21
4. Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991,22 which amended the EAA in an effort to sanction and
prohibit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.23
1.2 Defense Articles and Services Export Controls
(1) The Earlier Acts
The U.S. export control system originated from the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917, which restricted munitions exports to the enemy in the

16

Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2410 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
17
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 108-127.
18
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
19
Id. and see also John B. Geddes, The 1988 Trade Act and the Effect on United
States Export Controls to the People's Republic of China, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 611,
618-19 (Spring 1989).
20
Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq.
(Supp. III 1991)).
21
Id. and see also Molloy, supra note 15.
22
Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1233 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §2405(m)
(Supp. III 1991)).
23
Id.
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period of spanning World War I to World War II.24 However, the U.S.
government did not establish an arms export control regime until 1935 when
the Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1935,25 which gave the president
for the first time a legal basis for instituting a formal system to control
defense articles and services export.26 Subsequently, the following related
laws have been enacted to control the defense articles and services export:
• The Neutrality Act of 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 441 et seq. (2005)).
• The Mutual Defense Assistant Act of 1949, ch. 626, 63 Stat. 714 (1949).
• The Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, 65 Stat. 373 (1951) (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 272(b) et seq. (1988)).
• The Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, Stat. 832 (1954), (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1754, 1783, 1973 (1988)).
• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424
(1961) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 276 et seq. (2005)).
• The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320
(1968) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2341 et seq. (2005)).
• The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976, Pub. L. 94-321, (codified as 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. (2005)).
(2) Arms Export Control Act of 1976
Since 1976, the U.S. statutory authority for defense articles and
services export controls has been the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of
1976,27 which continues to authorize the president's power to control the
import and export of munitions and services. In addition, this act redefined the
president to designate the items of defense articles and services subject to
export control.
The AECA was amended in 1996 to cover brokering activity by all
persons (except officers/employees of the U.S. Government acting in an
24

John Heinz, U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s, 7
(Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1991). Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917, ch. 40
Stat 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 16, 7-39 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
25
Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935).
26
Joseph P. Smaldone, U.S. Commercial Arms Exports: Policy, Process and
Patterns, in Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1989, 185, 186-88 (New York, N.Y.:
Practicing Law Institute, 1989).
27
Also called Foreign Military Sales Act (Pub.L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat.
1320, codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 2797b-1 – 2799aa-1).
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official capacity) with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer
of any defense articles or defense service on the U.S. Munitions List of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, which is discussed below).
This coverage is not limited to U.S. origin defense articles/services, but can
also extend to brokering involving foreign defense articles and services.
Under the ITAR, persons engaged in the business of brokering activities are
required to register with the Department of State and obtain the applicable
authorizations for each brokering transaction. Brokering activities involving
non-munitions items, where known by the perpetrator to be destined for
WMD or missile activities, would also be subject to U.S. catch-all controls.
1.3 Nuclear Equipment and Technology Export Controls
(1) Atomic Energy Act
The Atomic Energy Act of 194628 was the first statutory law to
establish a control system to regulate the export and import of any fissionable
materials and technical data. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended
entirely by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,29 which has also been amended
many times since 1954. The Atomic Energy Act authorized the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to
control the exports of nuclear equipment and technology, such as nuclear
reactors and plants for producing nuclear materials. Some nuclear materials
that can be used for civilian purposes and on the “Nuclear Referral List” are
under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department.30
(2) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
On July 1, 1968, the United States and the former Soviet Union, with
some other nations, concluded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons31 (which has been open for signature since then) in order to prevent
the nuclear proliferation. As of 2000, a total of 187 parties have joined the
Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.32 More countries have
28

Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), (formerly codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1801-1819).
29
Also called McMahon Atomic Energy Act (Aug. 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 919),
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
30
10 C.F.R. § 110 (2005).
31
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 715 (1954), codified as
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297 (2005).
32
The number of joined parties is from the United Nations Website at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/.
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ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement.
This is a testament to the Treaty's significance. In 1970, this treaty became in
force for the United States when the Congress ratified the Treaty.
(3) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 197833 is one of the
most important acts that amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in a number
of significant ways with respect to U.S. nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation with foreign countries.34 In addition to tightening U.S. nuclear
export control with stricter criteria, the NNPA also requires any U.S.
corporations or citizens who directly or indirectly engage in the production of
special nuclear material outside the United States to be authorized by the
Secretary of Energy.35
1.4 Export Controls on Terrorists-Supporting or Embargoed Countries
Besides the above listed federal statutes targeted on the exports of
due-used goods, weapons, and nuclear equipments and materials, the U.S.
export control system also included the statutes controlling the trading with
specific terrorists-supporting or embargoed countries. The following are a list
of major federal statues in this area.
(1) Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 sets a general policy that would
denies export license of nearly all goods to be shipped to Cuba except the
shipping of medical items and other humanitarian items that may be approved
based on case-by case review.36 In addition, Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 imposes economic embargo on Cuba
including all restrictions on trade or transactions with, and travel to or from
33

Pub. L. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201
et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2074 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988)).
34
Carlton E. Thorne, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Considerations and the SNEC
Process, in Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1989, 313, 313 (New York, N.Y:
Practicing Law Institute, 1989).
35
John M. Rooney, the U.S. Department of Energy's Role in Export Control and
Nuclear Nonproliferation, in Coping With U.S. Export Controls 1990, 303, 304-06
(New York, N.Y: Practicing Law Institute, 1990).
36
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-484, Div. A, Title XVII, Oct.
23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2575), codified at 22 USC §§ 6001 to 6010 (2005).
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Cuba, and all restrictions on transactions in property in which Cuba or
nationals of Cuba have an interest.37
(2) Statues Related Embargos on Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
Congress has at least enacted the following laws to impose economic
embargo and export controls on Iran. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990,38 Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992,39 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of
1996,40 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000,41 Iran Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 2002,42 and Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act of 2003.43 Since Congress enacted the Iraq and Afghanistan
Reconstruction and International Assistance Act of 2003,44 many restrictions
on exports to Iraq and Afghanistan have been eased.
(3) Tiananmen Square Sanctions
On February 16, 1990, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991.45 Title IX of this law,
Congress condemned the Chinese regime brutally crackdown the Chinese
peaceful demonstrators in June 1989 and asked the president of the United
States to (1) suspend all exports of items on the United States Munitions List,
including arms and defense related equipment to China; (2) oppose the further
liberalization of the guidelines of the CoCom regarding trade with China; (3)
take no further action to implement the agreement for cooperation between
the United States and China relating to the uses of nuclear energy, thereby
foreclosing the issuance of new licenses; and (4) suspend the license for the
export of any United States manufactured satellites for launch on launch
vehicles owned by China, including the two Aussat satellites and the Asiasat
satellite.46
37

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (also
called Helms-Burton Act) (Pub. L. No. 104-114, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 785),
codified at 22 USC §§ 1643l, 1643m, 6021 to 6024, 6031 to 6046, 6061 to 6067,
6081 to 6085, 6091 (2005).
38
Pub. L. No. 101-513, Title V, §§ 586, 586a to 586j, 104 Stat. 2047 (1990).
39
Pub. L. No. 102-484, Div. A, Title XVI, 106 Stat. 2571 (1992).
40
Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
41
Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000).
42
Pub. L. No. 107-228, Div. B, Title XIII, Subtitle D (§§ 1341 to 1345), 116 Stat.
1451 (2002).
43
Pub. L. No. 108-175, 117 Stat. 2482 (2003).
44
Pub. L. No. 108-106, Title II, 117 Stat. 1222 (2003).
45
Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15 (1990).
46
Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 901, 104 Stat. 15, 901 (1990).
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2. Congressional Committees
There are two major congressional committees having jurisdiction over export
controls. They are:
(1) The House Committee on International Relations (used to be called the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs) oversees the affairs regarding export
controls, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear
hardware. Its website is at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_ relations/.
The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-proliferation (used to
be called the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment) is
the specific subordinate committee in charge of measures and legislation
pertaining to export controls. The subcommittee chairman is Rep. Edward R.
Royce (Republican from California) as of January 2006. Its website is at
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/itnhear.htm.
(2) The Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance under the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is the specific
subordinate committee in charge of export controls. Its website is at
http://banking.senate.gov/.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
3.1 Dual-Use Goods Export Controls -- Export Administration
Regulations (EAR)
The EAA authorized the Department of Commerce to create a set of
regulations to implement the export control law. The popular name for these
regulations is the Export Administration Regulations or EAR in short. The
current EAR were rewritten in 1996 and are codified as 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-799
(2005) (approximately 700 page long).47 The GPO created and maintains a
website for EAR at http://www.access.gpo.gov /bis/index.html, which
includes all the relevant C.F.R. sections and the rules published in Federal
Register affecting the EAR. The EAR regulates not only the exports of dualuse goods, software, and technology from the U.S. but also the re-exports of
U.S.-origin items from other countries, sales of foreign made products
containing U.S.-origin components or derived from U.S.-origin technology,
and disclosure of U.S.-origin technology to foreign nationals.48
47

61 Fed. Reg. 12734 (Mar. 25, 1996).
Eric L. Hirschhorn, the Export Control and Embargo Handbook 6 (New York:
Oceana Publications, Inc., 2nd., 2005). See also 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2005).
48
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3.2 Defense Articles and Services Export Controls -- International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
Under the AECA, the Department of State exercised the authority on the
president's behalf by promulgating a set of rules to control munitions and
defense services exports.49 The popular name for the rules is International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which are codified as 22 C.F.R. §§ 120130 (2005) and administrated by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC) under the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the State
Department.50 The defense articles and services subjected to the export
control are listed on the United States Munitions List (USML).51
3.3 Nuclear Equipments and Technology Export Controls
The federal regulations regarding the nuclear equipment and
technology export controls are scattered among several titles of the C.F.R.
The main regulations are listed as follows. For some nuclear equipments and
technologies, if they are on the “Nuclear Referral List,” they are under the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Department; if they appear on the U.S.
Munitions List, they are under the jurisdiction of the State Department.52
Exporting all other nuclear equipment is under the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) while exporting nuclear technology is under the Energy
Department.53
•
•
•

49

TITLE 10--Energy Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part
110--Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material § 110, 10
C.F.R. §§ 110 et seq (2005);
TITLE 32--National Defense Chapter I--Office of The Secretary of
Defense Part 223--Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled
Nuclear Information (Dod Ucni), 32 C.F.R. §§ 223 et seq (1993);
TITLE 10-- Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 170-Fees For Facilities, Materials, Import And Export Licenses, And
Other Regulatory Services Under The Atomic Energy Act Of 1954,
As Amended, 10 C.F.R. § 170 (2005);

22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-2994 (2005).
22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2005).
51
22 D.F.R. § 121.1 (2005).
52
Eric L. Hirschhorn, the Export Control and Embargo Handbook 251 (2005).
53
Id.
50

458

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

•
•

[Vol. 35.3

TITLE 10--Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 75-Safeguards On Nuclear Material--Implementation Of US/IAEA
Agreement, 10 C.F.R. § 75 (2005);
TITLE 10--Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 10-Interpretations, 10 C.F.R. § 8 (2005).

4. Presidential Executive Orders or Proclamations
The presidents have often spoken out on export controls because the
export control laws authorize them to regulate the export controls. As
indicated above, almost every year since 1990, the presidents have issued the
executive orders entitled Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export
Control Regulations to keep Export Administration Act effective. The
presidents also issued other executive orders to implement export control
laws. For example, on November 16, 1990, the former President Bush
released an executive order, which was entitled “Chemical and Biological
Weapons Proliferation,” to initiate multilateral coordination on chemical and
biological weapons non-proliferation, and to impose severe sanctions against
foreign citizens or foreign countries with respect to chemical and biological
weapons proliferation.54
Looking for the current presidential executive orders or proclamations
on export controls, one can go to the Federal Register or Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, which has a table of contents for each issue, and
separate cumulative indexes published quarterly, semiannually and annually.
The subject term of “export controls” is indexed under “Commerce,
international”. Both of Federal Register or Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents are freely available on GPO’s website at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/executive.html#presidential. Presidential executive
orders and proclamations can also be retrieved from WESTLAW’s President
Documents database (PRES) or LEXIS' GENFED library/PRESDC file (the
presidential documents in LEXIS are from January 1981 to present only).

5. Governmental Commissions or Advisory Groups
5.1 Export Administration Review Board

54

Exec. Order No. 12735, 3 C.F.R. 313 (1990), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq (1988 & Supp III 1991).
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To resolve any possible interagency disputes, the Export
Administration Review Board was established by Executive Order No. 11533
of June 4, 1970 issued by former President Carter, and subsequently
continued by several other presidents. The board consists of the cabinet-level
secretaries and the heads of other government offices including the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency also serve
as nonvoting members of the board. The board also considers export licensing
policies, and actions, and advises the Secretary of Commerce on export
licensing.55
5.2 President's Export Council
This council advises the president on all aspects of export trade
including export controls, as well as promotion and expansion. The committee
in charge of export controls is called Subcommittee on Export Administration
which is separately chartered and administered by the Bureau of Industry and
Security at the Department of Commerce. The website of the council is
located at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/pec/index.html. Some of its
recommendation letters regarding the export control issues and regulations
can be found at its website.
The twenty-eight private-sector members of the Council are
appointed by the president. They serve, “at the pleasure of the president,” with
no set term of office. As of 2006, Five United States Senators and five
members of the House of Representatives are appointed to the Council by the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, respectively. The
Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Treasury, State, and Homeland
Security; the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States; the
U.S. Trade Representative; and the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration are also members of the Council.
6. Federal Agencies and Their Responsibilities
The export control laws described above have authorized the
following federal agencies to implement these laws and impose the penalties
on violators. To effectively enforce the export controls, the involved federal
agencies also need to coordinate cohesively.
55

Exe. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981-62984 (Dec. 8, 1995).
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6.1 Department of Commerce: Bureau of Industry and Security
Under the 1985 Export Administration Amendment Act, the dual-use
goods exports are controlled by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
[formerly the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)] under the Department
of Commerce. The primary responsibilities of the BXA are to establish and
maintain the Commodity Control List (CCL), classify the Country Groups for
export controlled destinations, and review and issue the validated licenses
upon individual exporters' requests. Its website is located at http:
www.bis.doc.gov/.
6.2 Departments of States: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
According to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (codified in 22
U.S.C. §§ 2778-2780) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) (22 CFR Parts 120-130), the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC), the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of States,
is in charge of controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles
and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List. It has
among its primary missions (a) taking final action on license applications for
defense trade exports and (b) handling matters related to defense trade
compliance, enforcement, and reporting. Its website is located at
http://www.pmdtc.org/.
6.3 Department of Defense: Defense Thread Reduction Agency
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was created by as an agency
under the Department of Defense on October 1, 1998.56 Its mission is to
safeguard America and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing
capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its
effects. It is responsible for the development and implementation of policies
on international transfers of defense-related technology, and it also reviews
certain dual-use export license applications referred by the Department of
Commerce. Its website is at http://www.dtra.mil/index.cfm.

56

Joseph P. Harahan & Robert J. Bennett, Creating the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency 17-18 (2002).
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6.4 Department of Energy: Office of Export Control Policy and
Cooperation
The Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation is an office of
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA was
established by Congress in 2000 and is a semi-autonomous agency within the
U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security
through the military application of nuclear energy. NNSA maintains and
enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger
from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and
effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological
emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. The website of the NNSA is located at
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/index.htm.
6.5 Department of the Treasury: Office of Foreign Assets Control
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade
sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against
targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and
those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national emergency
powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose
sanctions on transactions and freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction.
Many of the sanctions are based on the United Nations and other international
mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied
governments. The website of the OFAC is at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/, which provides information
on these sanctions as well as the complete list of Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN list”).
6.6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Export Controls and International
Organizations Section
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an autonomous
agency not a part of the Executive Branch. The Export Controls and
International Organizations Section is responsible for planning, developing,
and implementing regulatory cooperation programs with international
organizations. The Section licenses the exports and imports of nuclear
equipment and material after interagency review with the Departments of
Energy, State, Defense, and Commerce and the Arms Control and
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Disarmament Agency. It also participates in international nuclear safeguard
activities, recommends policies, and coordinates NRC efforts with Executive
Branch agencies and other entities. The Website of the NRC is located at
http://www.nrc.gov/.
6.7 Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Customs and Border
Protection
U.S. customs officials have the authority to check any exporting
cargos against their export license at the borders to make sure the exports
complied with the export control laws. For more information about the
responsibilities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, check out its website
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/export/.
7. PRINCIPAL CASES
Due to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act under which the Commerce Department can be exempted from judicial
review for its administrative decisions on export controls,57 there were almost
no opportunities for aggrieved exporters to obtain judicial review of the
actions taken by the federal export control agencies. Therefore, there are few
cases brought by aggrieved exporters to challenge the Department of
Commerce in the federal courts. However, the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended the EAA so as to provide some limited
judicial review of the sanctions imposed by federal export control agencies.58
Thus, searching judicial opinions should not be ignored when conducting
legal research on export controls. Listed below, in reverse chronological
order, are six recent leading cases that dealt with different aspects of the
constitutionality of the export control laws and other issues as well.
7.1 Judicial Review of Decisions Made by Export Control Agencies
(1) U.S. v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992)

57

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). See also Moller-Butcher v. U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Export Admin., 12 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in which, the
D.C. Circuit Court held that the Export Administration Act precluded judicial review
of sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce on an exporter.
58
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1861 (1988).
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In Bozarov, the court held that: (1) the Export Administration Act is
lack of provision for judicial review of decisions made by the Secretary of
Commerce did not render the Act violating the non-delegation doctrine of the
constitution, and (2) lack of judicial review did not violate defendant's due
process rights.
(2) Dart v. U.S., 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
In Dart, the Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, held that: (1) although the
sanctions imposed by the Secretary of Commerce are generally precluded
from judicial review, if the functions exercised by the Secretary of Commerce
are not specified in Export Administration Act, such functions were subject to
limited judicial review, and (2) the Secretary of Commerce's reversal of an
administrative law judge's decision exceeded Secretary's authority under
Export Administration Act.
(3) Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
In 1985, Iran Air purchased two signal generators originated from the
United States through a German company and shipped them to Iran without
obtaining re-export license. In 1990, the Acting under Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration's found the re-exporting violated the Export
Administration Act and imposed $100,000 civil penalty on Iran Air. However,
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to hear the case ruled that the
Export Administration Act authorized sanctions only for knowing violations.
Because the Office of Export Enforcement had neither alleged nor proved that
Iran Air knowingly violated the law, the ALJ dismissed the charge. A federal
district court upheld the argument of the Acting under Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration that the ALJ's interpretation of the Act clashed with
the Department's firm position that “knowledge” is not a requirement in a
civil penalty case. Iran Air appealed the case. The Court of Appeals, D.C.
Circuit, held that:
…the Under Secretary may not reverse fact findings made by an ALJ,
but remains the final administrative arbiter on questions of law and
policy. We therefore affirm the Under Secretary's ruling that Iran Air
violated the Export Administration Act, but we vacate the sanctions
imposed and remand the case to the Under Secretary for a reasoned
determination of the appropriate sanction consistent with the ALJ's
assessment of the facts and the circumstances of Iran Air's violation.
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7.2 Constitutional Issues Related to Export Control Laws
(1) U.S. v. Soussi, 316 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2002), certiorari denied, 538 U.S.
971 (2003)
In Soussi, the defendant purchased thirty trailers for a Libya company
and tried to ship the trailers to Libya via Italy without obtaining an export
authorization. The defendant was convicted by jury in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, of willfully, knowingly, and
unlawfully participating in transaction involving export of goods to Libya in
violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals of 10th Circuit held that: (1)
defendant's conduct constituted violation of IEEPA even though trailers he
shipped to Libya never reached their destination; (2) executive order and
related regulations under IEEPA were not unconstitutionally vague as applied
to defendant.
(2) U.S. v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1990)
In Mandel, the court held that the Commerce Secretary's decision to
place item on the Commodity Control List was a political question not subject
to judicial review.
(3) U.S. v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1987)
In Mechanic, the defendants were convicted of attempting to export a
microwave calibration device without a validated export license. In appeal,
they raised a constitutional challenge to the regulation (15 C.F.R. § 387.3(a)
(1985)) which imposed criminal sanctions on those attempting to export
controlled substances by contesting the regulation exceeded the delegation of
authority granted under the EAA. However, the court held that the regulation
imposing criminal sanctions for attempting to violate export controls did not
exceed delegation of power granted under the EAA.
7.3 Statute of Limitation
U.S. v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
In 1994, McDonnell Douglas and Douglas Aircraft Company (jointly,
“MDC”) agreed to sell some machining tools made in 1960s from a closed
aircraft manufacturing plant in Ohio to China National Aero-Technology
Import and Export Corporation (“CATIC”). Because these machining tools
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can be used to make aircraft parts, MDC applied for export licenses from the
Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce issued the export
licenses for these tools with a condition that MDC must provide quarterly
reports to the Department of Commerce about the location of these machine
tools and how they were being used. After these tools being shipped to
Shanghai, China, CATIC moved six of them to its Nanchang facility without
informing MDC.
On April 4, 1995, shortly after MDC's required quarterly inspection
of the CATIC facility, MDC reported to the Department of Commerce that the
machine tools had been diverted to four different locations, including the
Nanchang facility. The government initiated an investigation, which
culminated in the indictment returned on October 19, 1999. The indictment
charged Hitt, the MDC’s director in China, MDC, CATIC, and two CATIC
employees with conspiring to violate the laws of the United States (18 U.S.C.
§371) and with aiding and abetting such a conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §2) in
connection with the allegedly fraudulent acquisition of the export licenses and
making false and misleading statements to the Department of Commerce after
the export licenses were issued.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (107
F.Supp.2d 29) dismissed conspiracy count on the ground that charge was
time-barred under the five-year statute of limitations. Government appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit Judge, held that conspiracy on the part
of American and Chinese defendants to deceive the United States into issuing
export licenses for aircraft machinery tools that were subject to export
controls ended with issuance of export licenses, not on a later date when tools
were actually exported and delivered, and thus indictment of executive for his
role was time-barred when not brought up within five years after the export
occurred.
7.4 Issues Related to the Freedom of Information Act
(1) Lessner v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 827 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987)
In Lessner, the plaintiff challenged the Department of Commerce's
refusal to supply him, upon his Freedom of Information Act request, with
names of businesses and individuals granted licenses to export to the Soviet
Union. The Court of Appeals held that such information constituted
“information obtained for the purpose of consideration of, or concerning,
license application” under the EAA, and thus, was exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.
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(2) U.S. v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989)
In Posey, the defendant is in the business of selling technical data
relating to military and commercial aircraft to contractors located both in the
United States and abroad. The information he sells is unclassified, and he
generally obtains it from the government through requests under the Freedom
of Information Act. In 1985, the FBI became aware that appellant was
arranging sales of technical data to purchasers in South Africa. The
government obtained a wiretap order from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court upon a finding that the defendant was an “agent of a
foreign power”. The wiretap confirmed that the defendant was arranging to
ship military technology manuals to South Africa. In early 1987, the
defendant was arrested after an associate was caught with aircraft manuals at
the airport, boarding a flight to Argentina en route to South Africa. The
defendant was charged with violation of export control law and was
convicted.
The defendant appealed to his conviction of a violation of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) and the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA). One of the defendant arguments is that the First Amendment
bars the government from restricting the export of information that is already
available to the public. He insists that the data he sent abroad was available
under the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore could be legally
obtained by virtually anyone in the world. He contends that the First
Amendment prohibits the application of the AECA and CAAA to the export
of such publicly available information. Therefore, under the First
Amendment, he should not be convicted of all the charges. However, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and held that the First Amendment
did not bar defendant's conviction for exporting non-classified technical
munitions information available to public under either AECA or CAAA.
7.4 Conviction Requirements under the Export Control Law
U.S. v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. Mo. 1987), certiorari denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988)
In Gregg, the defendant tried to export night vision goggles usable for
military purposes and military aircraft communication radios component parts
of a missile system without applied for State Department license. He was
charged and convicted by the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri. The 8th Circuit Court held the Conviction of defendant’s
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violation of export control law meets the prerequisites set under 50 U.S.C.S.
app. §2410, which requires proof of (1) willfulness; (2) violation of the EAA
of 1979 or a regulation issued there under; (3) and knowledge that the exports
involved will be used for the benefit of, or that the destination or intended
destination of the goods or technology involved is, any controlled country or
any country to which exports are controlled for foreign policy purposes.
8. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS WITH DEGREES
8.1 The Center for International Trade and Security at the University of
Georgia
The University of Georgia established the Center for East-West Trade
Policy to monitor and evaluate U.S. and Western alliance policies governing
East-West trade, particularly the role of governments, export controls, and
technology transfer. In 1995, the center was renamed the Center for
International Trade and Security. The Center routinely held conferences on
trade and security, nonproliferation of WMD, and terrorism issues. The center
also offers graduate programs in export controls and nonproliferation. The
center publishes various reports on the topic and Export Control Newsletter,
which is a monthly digest of export control-related news and developments
throughout the world. Many of these publications can be found at its website.
The center’s address and phone are 204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602,
706-542-2985, and website: http://www.uga.edu/cits/.
8.2 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies
The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) was established at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies (at http://www.miis.edu) in 1989
to combat the spread of WMD by training the next generation of
nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and
analysis. CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United
States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.
Today, CNS has a full-time staff of more than 40 specialists and over 50
graduate student research assistants located in offices in Monterey,
Washington, DC, and Almaty, Kazakhstan. CNS is organized into five
research programs: the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
Program, the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, the International
Organization and Nonproliferation Program, the Newly Independent States
Nonproliferation Program, and the WMD Terrorism Research Program. Each
program supports the Center's mission by training graduate students, building
a worldwide community of nonproliferation experts, publishing both on-line
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and print resources on all aspects of WMD, providing background material to
the media, and creating seminars and on-line tutorials to be used by high
school and college instructors and the general public. In conjunction with the
Masters in International Policy Studies Program of the Monterey Institute,
CNS offers a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies and internship
opportunities in international organizations that expand the career possibilities
and interests of Institute students. The center’s address information is 460
Pierce Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA, Telephone: (831) 647-4154; Fax:
(831) 647-3519 E-mail: cns@miis.edu; and Web: http://cns.miis.edu.
9. Seminars and Programs
Since the export controls are highly regulated by the administrative
agency and the regulations are very complex, a novice who wants to gain a
general background in export controls, should: 1) attend the Export
Administration Seminars and Workshops explaining the Regulations offered
by the Bureau of Industry and Security and its Regional Offices; 2) start with
some popular works in this area. The major seminars and educational
programs are listed as follows.
9.1 Coping with U.S. Export Controls Program
Practicing Law Institute has organized this annual program since
1984. It is usually held in Washington, D.C. This in-depth educational
program is presented by experts including the BIS’s officers and export
control practitioners. To obtain the program schedule, contact the Practicing
Law Institute (810 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019, Phone: (800)
260-4PLI, Fax: (800) 321-0093), website: http://www.pli.edu/. Practicing
Law Institute has also published the course handbooks for this program since
1984. The articles of the handbooks are available on Westlaw.
9.2 Export Control of Equipment, Technology and Services
The Federal Publications Seminars, a Thomson West business, is a
leading provider of practical courses and materials for contract
professionals. It also offers the seminar of Export Control of Equipment,
Technology and Services twice a year in Washington DC and Las Vegas. The
focus of this seminar is on practical solutions to the complex problems and
procedures involved in export licensing. The seminar covers:
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• The legal framework- Statutes and regulations; their magnitude,
requirements and daily impact.
• Preparation-What to do up front to prevent violations of the export
regulations and resultant penalties.
• Licensing procedures-A step-by-step guide for obtaining export
licenses; understanding the agencies that administer the regulations;
what questions to ask and when.
• License denials-How to appeal successfully.
• Enforcement procedures-Prosecution and available defenses.
• Special problems-Proliferation controls; technical data; computer
hardware/software; proposals; foreign trade shows; restricted countries;
emergency situations; plant visits by non-U.S. nationals; joint ventures.
The seminar offers 9.9 CLE and 9.0 CPE hours for participants and
charges $895 fees per person. For more information, please check its website
out at http://www.fedpubseminars.com/seminar/ eciic.html.
9.3 Society for International Affairs, Inc. (SIA)
The Society for International Affairs, Inc. is a voluntary, non-profit,
educational organization that was jointly formed in 1967 by U.S. Government
and manufacturers. Its mission is to educate the international trade community
on all aspects of technology transfer by providing a forum for the exchange of
information on the export and import process. The SIA interests cover the
entire spectrum of licensing issues pertaining to the Department of
Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury. The SIA holds conferences and
training seminars on export control law compliance several times each year.
For the information about these conferences and seminars, check the website
of the SIA at http://www.siaed.org/. It also publishes a quarterly newsletter
called the SIA Newsletter. Some of the back issues can be viewed at its
website (http://www.siaed.org/en/ cms/?15).
9.4 Law School Course: U.S. Export Control Law and Regulation
Professor Calabrese at George Washington School of Law offers this
course, in which the students will study U.S. laws and regulations that govern
the export of defense products and dual-use civilian technologies and examine
international export control treaties and case studies. The students will also
participate in team exercises involving export transactions.
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9.5 BIS Export Control Seminar Programs
The Exporter Counseling Division of the BXA, the former title of
BIS, used to offer a one-day introductory export administration seminar every
two weeks in Washington D.C. and a few major cities in the U.S. Today, the
BIS offers more of export control seminars. Such seminars are not only
offered in Washington D.C. but in almost all major cities in the U.S. These
seminar programs are listed as follows:
Complying with U.S. Export Controls: This two-day program
provides an in-depth examination of the Export Administration Regulations.
The program will cover the information exporters need to know to comply
with U.S. export control requirements on commercial goods by focusing on
what items and activities are subject to the EAR; steps to take to determine
the export licensing requirements for your item; how to determine the Export
Control Classification Number (ECCN); when you can export or re-export
without applying for a license; export clearance procedures and record
keeping requirements; Export Management System (EMS) concepts; and real
life examples in applying this information.
Intermediate Deemed Export: This half-day program is for
exporters who have basic knowledge of the EAR and have a solid
understanding of how to apply the regulations and to classify technology
properly. This highly intensive program will integrate practical exercises and
presentations about the appropriate sequence of analysis in assessing deemed
export licensing requirements.
Essentials of Export Controls: This is an intensive, one-day
program that covers the key information on how to comply with the EAR the
major elements of the U.S. export control system for commercial exports.
Technology Controls: This full-day program will offer a
comprehensive look at how to comply with the U.S. export and re-export
controls relating to technology, software, and encryption, including what is
considered an export or re-export of technology or software; what technology
and software is subject to the EAR; how to determine the ECCN; what license
exceptions are available; and the unique application requirements of
technology and software. BIS technical and policy specialists will also discuss
important export control issues that may arise in the employment of foreign
nationals and for foreign items incorporating, or produced from, controlled
U.S.-origin software and technology. The afternoon will focus on the latest
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developments in encryption controls and the unique provisions related to
encryption under the EAR.
How to Classify Your Item: This half-day workshop will provide a
detailed look at the step-by-step process for determining the appropriate
ECCN to avoid pitfalls that may lead to inaccurate classifications. This handson workshop is ideal for those with technical backgrounds.
How To Develop an Export Management and Compliance
Program: This program provides participants who have a basic knowledge of
export controls with information on how to develop an Export Management
and Compliance Program (EMCP), which is a written set of company
guidelines and institutionalized procedures to be used to ensure employees
know their export control responsibilities, that the right procedures are being
followed, and that the right questions are being asked to safeguard against
exports being made that are contrary to the EAR and U.S. national security
interests.
Export Compliance for Forwarders: These full-day and half-day
workshops are ideal for freight forwarders, carriers, and others in the
transportation industry who need to learn their responsibilities under the EAR
and the Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations. Regulatory specialists from BIS
will review the major elements of the U.S. export control system for
commercial/dual use exports and provide you with information on your
responsibilities and liabilities in export transactions.
Exploring the EAR: This half-day program has been specially
designed for exporters who have had at least three years of commerce export
licensing experience and would like to further their knowledge and usage of
the EAR. The program will look at the regulations through the practical
approach of case studies and show how to find and appropriately use those
sections of the EAR that apply to export transactions.
Intermediate License Exceptions: This program is designed for
exporters who have at least one year of commerce export licensing
experience. The program is intended to enhance participants’ understanding
of the terms, provisions, applicability, and use of all License Exceptions in
Part 740 of the EAR. Specific topics covered will include recent changes to
License Exceptions provisions; the restrictions that govern the use of all
License Exceptions; the distinction between list based and transaction based
License Exceptions; and the use of Country Groups designations in
determining license exception eligibility.
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The detail descriptions and schedule for these seminars and
workshops are available at BIS website at http://www.bis.doc.gov/. Time to
time, the BIS also works with foreign governments to hold such seminars in
foreign countries to educate local business communities about U.S. and the
hosting countries’ export controls, regulations and enforcement. For example,
the BIS and the Ministry of Commerce of China co-hosted two such seminars
in China respectively in 2000 and 2003.
9.6 Automated Services of the Bureau of Industry and Security
(1) The Simplified Network Application Process (SNAP)
SNAP is a Web-based system that enables exporters to submit export
and re-export license applications, high performance computer notices, and
commodity classification requests directly to BIS via the Internet in a secure
environment. The URL is http://www.bis.doc.gov/snap/index.htm.
(2) Telephone Access/Voice Information Services
This is an automated telephone service provided by Exporter
Counseling Division of the BIS to answer the most frequently asked
questions. This service can be reached from a touch tone telephone in
Washington D.C. at (202) 482-4811, or either one of the Regional Offices of
the BIS in California at (949) 660-0144 or (408) 998-7402. The range of
recorded information includes: information on obtaining Commodity
Classifications; emergency handling procedures; forms or publications;
regulations updates; seminar program information; and facsimile machine
telephone numbers.
(3) The System for Tracking Export License Applications (STELA)
STELA is the BXA digitized voice answering service which provides
exporters with timely information on the status of their applications for export
license. To reach STELA, use a touch tone phone to call (202) 482-2752.59
PART TWO: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONS
To prevent the countries that are hostile to the United States or
potential adversaries from possessing due-use technologies, weapons of mass
59

See also http://www.bis.doc.gov/Licensing/STELA4U.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2007).
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destruction, and missile technologies from other industrialized countries, the
United States, after the World War II, has worked with its allies to create
several international regimes to control the transfer of these technologies and
weapons. Furthermore, to reduce the arm race and prevent WMD
technologies from being proliferated, the United States also negotiated with
the former Soviet Union and other nuclear-power countries to enter several
international treaties. The major international treaties and export control and
nonproliferation organizations are discussed as follows. In addition to these
inter-governmental efforts and diplomacies, some international nongovernmental organizations have made tremendous efforts to stop WMD
proliferation. Most of the following information was gathered by searching
the Internet and compiled from the websites listed below.
1. International Treaties
Between 1950s and 1990s, several multinational treaties to prevent
the use and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and related
technologies were negotiated and reached and has been opened for states to
join. These treaties have become the core source of international law on the
export control and nonproliferation of WMD.
1.1 IAEA and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
In December 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for
Peace” proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations
General Assembly, and urged that an international organization be established
to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against
development of weapons capabilities in additional countries.60 Based on the
proposal, in 1957, the UN established the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) within the UN family and authorized IAEA with the dual
responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology.61 The main
mission of IAEA is to promote the safeguard and verification of nuclear
materials and activities. The IAEA Statute was created to guide its missions
and work. For more information about IAEA and the full-text of the IAEA
Statute can be accessed at its website at http://www.iaea.org.
Within the framework of the UN, a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation
was addressed and negotiated between 1957 and 1968. By 1968 final
60

David Fisher, the First Forty Years: History of the International Atomic
Energy Agency 10 (1997).
61
Id. at 143.
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agreement had been reached on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which enable the international cooperation for the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving nuclear
disarmament. By 1970, the treaty became effective and open for signature.
Currently, there are 187 countries joined the treaty and the NPT one of the
most popular international treaties. The Treaty establishes a safeguard system
under the responsibility of IAEA. The NPT requires its nuclear-weapon states
not to transfer their nuclear weapons and technologies to any other states and
its non-nuclear-weapon state parties to put in place safeguards on all their
nuclear activities.62 The NPT also authorizes IAEA to verify that NPT parties
are complying with their safeguards obligations.63 These safeguards include
international inspections that help deter the use of nuclear material for nuclear
explosive purposes.
1.2 IAEA Additional Protocol
After the secret nuclear weapons programs of Iraq and North Korea
were exposed, the IAEA began an effort in 1993 to better constrain NPT
member-states' ability to illicitly pursue nuclear weapons. In 1997, the effort
resulted in the Model Protocol Additions to the Agreement(s) between
State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards,64 designed to
strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT only use nuclear materials and
facilities for peaceful purposes. The protocol asks the party nations of the
NPT to voluntarily ratify the protocol. For the ratification status of the
protocol, check out this website:
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/ sg_protocol.html.
1.3 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
On April 10, 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was reached and opened for
signature. This convention supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the
Biological Weapons Convention, the first multilateral disarmament treaty
62

Articles I and II of the NPT. The full-text of the NPT is available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/ Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf (last
visited Oct. 30, 2007).
63
Article III of the NPT.
64
The full-text of the protocol is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Infcircs/1998/ infcirc540corrected.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
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banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons. The BTWC
entered into force on March 26, 1975. Under its provisions, parties are
obligated not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological weapons or
agents or toxins of types or quantities that have no peaceful or protective
purposes. As of February 2006, the BTWC had 145 states parties and 18
signatories. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to
monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention. To
mitigate this shortcoming, Article XII of the BTWC stipulates that a
Conference should be held for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the
Convention and to ensure that its provisions and purposes are being upheld.
The Review Conferences convene in Geneva, Switzerland, at the request and
support of a majority of states parties. Under Article XII, the first such
Conference was to take place five years after the entry into force of the
Convention. The most recent conference (the Fifth Review Conference) was
held on December 7, 2001 and November 11–22, 2002.
In 2003, the Canadian government created the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention website, at http://www.opbw.org, to strengthen the
awareness and compliance of the BTWC. Currently, this website is
maintained by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford.
This website provides comprehensive, objective, and up-to-date information
about the BTWC. It includes the Convention, the status of signatory and
reservations made by the Party States, the Final Declarations of the successive
Review Conferences together with other documentation for the Review
Conferences as well as information on the ongoing efforts to strengthen the
regime. This website event lists some domestic laws of the Party States
related to export control and criminal penalties on biological weapon.
1.4 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
In 1992, after a decade of long negotiations within a multilateral
framework, the Conference on Disarmament under the United Nations agreed
to the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was then
adopted by the UN General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, on
November 30, 1992, in its resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction. As of February 2006, there were 175 party states to the
Convention, including the United States. The Convention prohibits all
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of
chemical weapons. It requires each state party to destroy chemical weapons
and chemical weapons production facilities it possesses, as well as any
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chemical weapons it may have abandoned on the territory of another state
party.
The CWC does not prohibit production, processing, consumption, or
trade of related chemicals for peaceful purposes, but it does establish a
verification regime to ensure such activities are consistent with the object and
purpose of the treaty. The verification provisions of the CWC not only affect
the military sector but also the civilian chemical industry, world-wide,
through certain restrictions and obligations regarding the production,
processing and consumption of chemicals that are considered relevant to
chemical weapons defined by the Convention. They will be verified through a
combination of reporting requirements, routine on-site inspections of declared
sites and short-notice challenge inspections. The Convention also contains
provisions on assistance in case a state party is attacked or threatened with
attack by chemical weapons and on promoting the trade in chemicals and
related equipment among States Parties.
To help American businesses to comply with the Convention, the
Bureau of Industry and Security under the Commerce Department and the
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation under the State
Department created and maintains a website at http://www.cwc.gov. This
website includes the full-text of the CWC, relevant U.S. federal regulations,
and the procedures for export declaration and inspection.
2. Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes
Besides the above international treaties, the international community
also established the following organizations to coordinate nonproliferation
efforts. However, there is no enforcement mechanism within the regimes. The
member nations are voluntary to adhere to the nonproliferation guidelines
created by these regimes based on their national export control laws.
2.1 CoCom and Wassenaar Arrangement
In 1949, the United States and its Western allies created the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) as a
mechanism to coordinate (1) allied export control policies, (2) the lists of
controlled items, and (3) the enforcement of the controls, in order to restrict
Western trade with the Soviet Union and its communist allies (later the
Warsaw Pact countries). Its members are the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) nations except Iceland but including Japan and
Australia. CoCom was based in Paris. Actually, CoCom was not an
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international organization, but a coordinating mechanism. There was no
international treaty or other agreement having been reached to govern
CoCom. Measures agreed to among the members of CoCom would not have
legal effect until the participating governments pass laws or regulations to
implement them.65
The Warsaw Pact lasted throughout the Cold War until 1991,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the other communist states in
Europe. Due to the end of the Cold War and economic interests, the Western
European countries wanted to change the international export control policy
and increase their trades with the Eastern European countries and China. In
November 1993, at a meeting in Hague, the Netherlands, the CoCom
members agreed to dismantle CoCom by March 31, 1994, and to replace it
with a new export control regime. The new control regime would focus on
arms, arms-related exports and on nuclear and missile non-proliferation,
particularly to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.66 On July 12, 1996 after
five rounds of negotiations among the former members of CoCom in
Wassenaar, a Dutch town near Hague, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Control for Conventional Arms and dual-use Goods and Technologies (WA)
was established to success CoCom.67 Today, there are forty member states for
the WA. Most of them are European countries including Russia and most of
the other former communist Eastern European countries. Japan and South
Korea are also members of the WA. For more information about the WA,
check out its website at http://www.wassenaar.org.
Although the purpose of WA is to contribute to regional and
international security and stability, its function has been reduced from the
export control coordination of the CoCom to merely the promotion of
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and
dual-use goods and technologies. In addition, the decision to transfer or deny
transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State
according to its national legislation and policies. Therefore, the effectiveness
of WA as an international export control regime is quite minimal today.
65

Cecil Hunt, CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in
Coping With U.S. Export Controls 1993, 295, 303-4 (New York, N.Y. : Practicing
Law Institute, 1993).
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2.2 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR is an informal multilateral organization established in
1987 without a treaty but a political understanding among the participating
countries to seek controls on the spread of goods and technologies that relate
to the production or use of missiles, which can be used to deliver WMD.
Currently, there are 33 participating countries, including most of European
countries, Russia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Africa, South
Korea, and the United States. Its website is at http://www.mtcr.info/english/.
The Regime created and maintains the MTCR Guidelines and the
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex. The Guidelines define the
purpose of the MTCR and provide the overall structure and rules to guide the
member countries and those adhering unilaterally to the Guidelines. The
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is designed to assist in
implementing export controls on MTCR Annex items, which include a broad
range of equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, which are
relevant to missile development, production, and operation. Partner countries
exercise restraint in the consideration of all transfers of items contained in the
Annex. All such transfers are considered on a case by case basis by the
participating countries.
2.3 Australia Group
The Australia Group (AG) was formed in Sydney, Australia in 1985,
following international concerns about the use of chemical weapons during
the Iran-Iraq War to work against the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons. In its December 1992 meeting, the members agreed to impose
export controls on a common list of biological organisms, toxins, and
equipment.68 The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the
effectiveness of participating countries’ national export licensing measures to
prevent would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for chemical and
biological weapons programs. Participants in the Australia Group do not
undertake any legally binding obligations: the effectiveness of their
cooperation depends solely on a shared commitment to chemical and
biological weapons non-proliferation goals and the strength of their respective
national measures. Similar to the MTCR, the AG also created and maintains a
nonproliferation guideline and control list for its members to follow. The
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Export Controls: Clinton Sends Congress Report on Chemical Weapons
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guideline and control list can be obtained from its website is at
http://www.australiagroup.net/.
Currently the group consists of forty countries. Most of the
participating countries are European countries but Russia does not participate.
The other countries include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, South
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States. The United States
strongly encourages all countries to adopt national export controls consistent
with the AG standards. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11th and
the subsequent anthrax bioterrorism in the United States, the U.S. has been
working to strengthen the AG to address better chemical and biological
weapon proliferation and terrorism.
2.4 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NPT of 1968 granted non-nuclear-weapon states access to
nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes as long as they
committed not to develop nuclear weapons. However, in 1974, India
conducted an initial nuclear explosion to test its nuclear bomb development
capability. The test alerted the NPT nuclear supplier states that nuclear
technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused so they
established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to restrict the exports
of certain equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear
weapons by providing a series of guidelines to its member states. These
guidelines can be found at the NSG’s website at
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/. The NSG Guidelines are implemented
by each Participating Government according to its national laws and practices
by making the decisions on export controls of nuclear technologies and
equipment.
Now the NSG has 44 nations and consists of all the nations of
Australia Group and some of the Eastern European nations: Bulgaria, the
former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Russia. China also joined the
NSG in 2004.
2.5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA was founded in 1957 and currently consists of 114 member
states. Its primary objectives are to ensure any assistance given by the agency
is not used for military purposes, and to safeguard nuclear materials and
equipment from proliferation. Under the current U.S. system of nuclear export
controls, the nation receiving nuclear goods is required to accept the IAEA
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safeguards on all of its peaceful nuclear activities. For more information
IAEA, please see IAEA and Treaty on the NPT and IAEA Protocol discussed
above.
2.6 Zangger Committee
The Zangger Committee, named after its first Chairman Prof. Claude
Zangger from Switzerland also known as the “NPT Exporters Committee”,
was formed following the coming into force of the NPT, to serve as the
“faithful interpreter” of its Article III, paragraph 2, to harmonize the
interpretation of nuclear export control policies for NPT Parties. Article III.2
of the Treaty is about “especially designed or prepared equipment or material
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.” The
Zangger Committee maintains a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as a
condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in
identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls.
Today the Zangger Committee has 36 members including all the
nuclear weapon States. Its Trigger List includes illustrative examples of
equipment and materials judged to be within the understandings of the
Committee. The Trigger List and the Zangger Committee's understandings are
published by the IAEA in the INFCIRC/209 series. The Zangger Committee
also published a series of publications on nuclear non-proliferation. These
publications are available on its website at
http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/ Publications/default.htm.
3. EU Policy on Export Controls for Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Many EU member states possess WMD or technologies to make
WMD. To prevent WMD and related technologies from going to undesired
hands, the EU has established an export control system to set a uniform policy
and coordinate its member states’ efforts on nonproliferation. In addition to
control its member states’ exporting WMD and related goods, the EU also
actively participated in some other international efforts to promote
nonproliferation among the countries that are not EU members.
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3.1 Policies
Non proliferation and disarmament, in particular when it comes to
weapons of mass destruction has always been a subject of high sensitivity and
political importance for the European Union as stated in the external relation
website of the EU.69 The EU general policy towards non proliferation and
disarmament is: to keep a global approach, which insists on the respect,
development and effective implementation of international multilateral
treaties and conventions to ban or to minimize the recourse to and
development of WMD.70 In December 2003, the European Council adopted
an EU strategy against WMD proliferation in December 2003.71 The EU
believes a global approach renders the world safer, as long as verification
mechanisms are in place, respected and applied effectively. In addition to the
multilateral approach, the EU also takes some complementary protection or
defensive measures like export controls to further reduce the risk of
proliferation and use of WMD. The EU has developed the following specific
approaches for its member states when handling non proliferation and
disarmament of WMD issues.
During political dialogue with third countries, the issue is frequently
raised and the EU standpoint, first discussed and agreed upon between the
Member States, is recalled and explained. At EU level the proliferation risks
are duly taken into account. The safeguards systems implemented within the
EU, the commitments of the Member states in the different international nonproliferation regimes (Australia group, Missile Technology Control Regime,
Nuclear Supplier’s Group, Wassenaar, Zangger), and specific regulations, like
the Council regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, are important contributions to the
global non-proliferation regime.
Finally, assistance programs are designed and implemented, in
particular with Russia and other Newly Independent States and North Korea,
to reinforce non-proliferation or support the realization of disarmament
projects. These programs are financed from different Community Budget
sources and managed by the Commission.72
69

See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/npd/index.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2007).
70
Id.
71
The full-text of the strategy is available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/118532.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
72
Id.
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3.2 Actions
In the frame of the EU Common Strategy in the Russian Federation,
the EU Council launched a program on Non-proliferation and Disarmament in
the Russian Federation in December 1999, in which the EU objective is to
support the Russian Federation in its efforts towards arms control and
disarmament.73 The program proposes the following actions:
1. To cooperate with the Russian Federation in the latter’s pursuit of a
safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement and /or reconversion of infrastructure and equipment linked to its WMD;
2. To provide a legal and operational framework for an enhanced
European Union role in cooperative risk reduction activities in the
Russian Federation through project orientated cooperation; and
3. To promote coordination as appropriate of programs and projects in
this field at Community, Member State and international level.74
3.3 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
In October 1994, the Agreed Framework between the United States
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was signed in order
to avoid a nuclear non-proliferation crisis. Under the Agreed Framework, the
DPRK agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program, and in
return, the United States agreed to finance and construct in the DPRK two
light-water reactors and provide the DPRK with an alternative source of
energy. To achieve these goals, Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established on March 9, 1995, when Japan, the
Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States expressed their common
desire to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework and signed
the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization.75 KEDO provides for the financing, building, and
supply of a reactor project and for the supply of interim energy supplies. The
EU recognizes that KEDO is a major industrial project that constitutes a vital
contribution to non-proliferation, stability and rapprochement on the Korean
73

The Council Joint Action of December 17, 1999 on Establishing a European
Union Cooperation Program for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian
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Peninsula. The EU concluded an Accession Agreement to KEDO as an
Executive Board member On September 19, 1997. Unfortunately, due to the
continued and extended failure of the DPRK to perform the steps that were
required in the KEDO-DPRK, the Executive Board of KEDO decided on May
31, 2006 to terminate the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project. However, the
KEDO will continue to exist, as necessary to settle financial and legal
obligations stemming from the termination of the LWR project.76
3.4. Dual Use Goods Export Controls
The EU understands that “dual-use” goods and technology
developed for civilian uses can be used for military applications or to
produce weapons so the EU recognizes the necessity of export controls
(licensing) of these items. The EU requires all its member states to control
export of these dual-use items. The European Court of Justice also
established case law in the area of dual-use goods to legitimize the common
commercial policy, as set out in Article 133 of the EC Treaty, which requires
the EU member states to abide the export control rules when exporting dualuse items to third countries.77 The EU member states also individually
participate in a number of international non-proliferation regimes (the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the
Australia Group), and in the Wassenaar Arrangement (except Cyprus).78
On June 22, 2000, the Council of EU adopted the new European Dual
Use Regulation (n°1334/2000) setting up a Community regime for the control
of exports of dual use items and technology, which was subsequently
published in OJ L159 of 30.06.2000. The Regulation builds on the previous
regime, but is now based completely on Article 133 of the EC Treaty, relating
to Common Commercial Policy, which entered into force on September 28,
2000.79 This EU regulation also harmonized the export control list of dual-use
items, licensing requirements, and procedures for the export and transfer of
dual-use items for all EU Member States. The member countries of the EU
76
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regularly send their export related questions to the meetings of the EU export
control working groups for review.
Besides the individual member state participating in the above stated
international nonproliferation regimes, the EU Commission also involved
itself with these regimes to reinforce the consistency and effectiveness of
non proliferation export control measures. The Commission is a full
member at the Australia Group, a permanent observer at the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and participates in the EU
Presidency Delegation in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in
the Wassenaar Arrangement.
4. UK Export Control Regime: the Export Control Organization
As a major nuclear power country that also holds a lot of advanced
technologies that can be used to develop WMD and WMD delivery systems,
the United Kingdom (UK) has cooperated with the United States very closely
on export controls and also created a sophisticated export control system.
Therefore, the UK export control system deserved a bit more discussions.
4.1. Export Control Act
The current export control regime of UK is based on the UK’s Export
Control Act of 2002. Under the Act, trading including trafficking and
brokering between oversees countries of the following goods are subject to
export controlled:
• All goods contained within Schedule 1 of the Export of Goods, Transfer
of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance;
• Long range missiles and their component parts (range over 300 km);
• Certain paramilitary good whose export the Government has already
banned because of evidence of their use in torture; and
• Goods on the UK Military List to any embargoed destination.
The structure of UK’s Export Control Act is very similar to the U.S.
export control legislation. It created several export-controlled commodities
lists called UK Strategic Export Control Lists which include UK National
Military List, UK National Explosive-related List, UK National Dual-use List,
UK National Human Right List (goods falling under the EU Human Rights
list and goods that are used for capital punishment and torture), UK National
Security and Paramilitary, and UK National Radioactive List. UK exporters
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can check their export products against these lists to see if they need export
licenses. The full-text of the Export Control Act of 2002 is available at
ttp://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file8418.pdf or
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020028.htm.
4.2. Export Control Administration
The administrative agency in charge is the Export Control
Organisation (ECO), which is part of the Europe and World Trade Directorate
(EWT) which, in turn, is part of the Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (BERR) of the UK government. The chief task of the
ECO is to process applications for licences to export any of the strategic
goods including dual use goods that can be used for both civilian and military
purposes from the UK. Due to the complexity of the export control regime,
the ECO also provides the following services to facilitate the export control
licensing process:
• Provides help for exporters, via a Helpline, a website, a DVD and
video, and programs of seminars and workshops;
• Enforces export control compliance with the terms of “open” licences
through regular company visits;
• Runs a Rating Service which advises exporters on whether or not a
licence is required in a particular instance;
• Records figures about licensing applications for the Government's
annual report on strategic export controls, details of which are available
on the Foreign Office website;
• Takes part in the work of the international arms control regimes,
updates the control lists, develops new “open general” licences and
contributes to government export licensing policy;
• Works with other government departments on counter-proliferation
activities; and
• Takes part in an international outreach programs to promote good
export licensing practice in other countries, particularly those which
have recently joined the European Union.
The contact information of the ECO is: Export Control Organisation,
3rd Floor, Kingsgate House, 66-74 Victoria Street, London SW1E 6SW, email: eco.help@dti.gsi.gov.uk and the website:
http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/index.html.
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5. Russian Export Control Regime: the Center for Export Controls
The formal Soviet Union and its successor, Russian Federation, have
had a very large stockpile of WMD and has been a major exporter of nuclear
equipment and missiles and related technologies. In the era of the Soviet
Union, the communist government had created an export control regime to
regulate the export of its nuclear and other dual-use products and
technologies. The Russian Federation inherited the export control system and
restructured it later. Therefore, the Russian export control system is also
deserved more attention.
5.1 Export Control Legislation
After 1992, the newly-founded Russian Federation was able to
quickly re-establish a new export control regime based on the old export
control system existed in the Soviet Union. Since then, Russia has
promulgated several legislations dealing with export controls. The most
import statute is the Federal Law on Export Control promulgated on July 29,
1999, which provides the legal foundation for the Russian export control
system. It establishes the framework for the state's export control policy. The
law defines what export control and controlled goods are, and specifies the
responsibilities of government agencies and of firms exporting goods that are
subject to control. The law authorizes the Russian President to define basic
guidelines of Russia's export control policy, to coordinate between various
governmental agencies responsible for conducting export control, and
approves lists of controlled goods and technologies. The law authorizes the
Russian Prime Minister to implement export control policy including
compliance with international export control regimes, to determine procedures
for conducting foreign trade in controlled items, and to negotiates and signs
international export control agreements on behalf of the Russian Federation.
The Prime Minister also coordinates policy, implements legislation, resolves
interagency disputes, and makes recommendations for improving licensing
procedures and other regulations. The law established the Export Control
Commission, an interagency body, which is responsible for coordinating
policy, implementing legislation, resolving interagency disputes, and making
recommendations for improving licensing procedures and other regulations.
The full-text English translation of this law is available at
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/excon/ exconlaw.htm and the
full-text of this law in Russian can be found in the Russian Legislation
Database at http://law.optima.ru.
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5.2 Export Control Administrative Agency
The Russian export control law also created the Department of Export
Control (DEK) under Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
(MEDT) as the administrative agency to issue all licenses for exports of
controlled goods, provide organizational and informational support to the
Export Control Commission, coordinate with development of regulations and
implementation of interagency review process, and provide information
support to exporters. On March 9, 2004, a Russian presidential decree was
issued that transferred the responsibilities of the Department of Export
Control of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to a new
Federal Service of Technical and Export Controls Service (FSTEC) to be
established under the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the FSTEC became the
major export control administrative agency in Russia. Its website is at
http://www.fstec.ru/.
5.3 Center for Export Controls
The Center for Export Controls (CEC) is a NGO with strong
connection with Russian government on export controls. Its mission is
providing information, training, and consulting in support of Russian
exporters whose products and/or services constitute probable precursors for
the creation of WMD. The CEC offers organization and implementation of
training in export controls for dual-use product exporting industry, assistance
in developing internal compliance programs, and preparation, evaluation, and
issuance of licensing documentation and international contracts on dual-use
commodity, service, and technology exports. The founders of the CEC are :
Department for International Relations, the Ministry of Nuclear Energy of
Russian Federation; M.V. Khrunichev Research and Manufacturing Space
Center; M.V. Keldysh Research Center; Russian League of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs; League of Assistance to Defense Industry. The CEC’s
activities are supported by the federal executive offices involved in the
national export control system of the Russian Federation. In particular, the
CEC maintains close working relationship with the following Russian Federal
agencies:
• Security Council (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/);
• Department for Export Controls, Ministry of Economic Development
and Trade (http://www.economy.gov.ru/merit/dep_dek/index_dek.htm);
• Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(http://www.mid.ru);
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Export Control Division, Ministry of Defense (http://www.mil.ru);
RF Ministry of Nuclear Energy (http://www.minatom.ru/);
Russian Aerospace Agency (http://www.rosaviakosmos.ru/);
RF State Customs Committee (http://www.customs.ru/rus/index.xpml);
RF Committee for Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States.

The CEC also maintains working contacts with the U.S. federal
agencies and institutions and other foreign government agencies in charge of
export controls. The contact information of the CEC is: Russia, 125438,
Moscow, Onezhskaya, 8; Tel./fax: 7 (095) 456-23-36, e-mail:
expcon@aha.ru; and website :
http://www.expcon.ru/EnglishVer/Enindex.htm.
6. Export Control Regimes of China, Germany, Japan, India, and Pakistan
6.1 China, the People’s Republic of
The Second Office of the Export Control Section of the Department
of Machinery, Electrical, and High Tech Production of the Ministry of
Commerce is the major Chinese administrative agency in charge of export
controls. Its website (in Chinese only) is at
http://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/. The Chinese export control laws and
regulations, controlled commodity lists, export licensing procedure can be
found at this website.
The Department of Disarmament and Arm Controls of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is in charge of handling issues such as arms control,
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear export control, and global and
regional security, to implement the general and specific policies in the abovementioned fields and to conduct diplomatic affairs related to the abovementioned fields. Its English website is at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwt/cjjk/default.htm.
6.2 Germany, the Federal Republic
The Federal Republic of Germany is a member of numerous
international treaties and export control regimes aiming at the harmonization
of export control regulations and licensing policies. As a member state of the
EU, Germany also follows the export control regulations and the controlled
item lists created by the EU. The Federal Office of Economics and Export
Control (BAFA) under the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
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(BMWi), is responsible for the administrative implementation of the Federal
Government's export control policy and the German central licensing
authority working in close co-operation with other federal agencies on a
complex export control system. The English website of the BAFA is at
http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/index.html. The export control and licensing
information of Germany can be found at this website.
6.3 Japan
The Trade and Industry Security Export Control Office of the
Ministry of Economy is the main Japanese administrative agency in charge of
export controls. Its website is at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/
anpo/index.html. The Japanese legislations and some government publications
on export controls can be found at this website.
The Website of the Arms Control, Disarmament and NonProliferation Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affair can be found at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/index.html.
The Center for Information on Security Export Control (CISTEC) is
the only non-profit and non-governmental organization in Japan dealing with
security export control issues comprehensively. CISTEC aims to contribute to
world peace by supporting rational and effective security export control and
by serving as a “linkage channel” among industry, government and academia
on security export control. Its website is at
http://www.cistec.or.jp/english/cistec/introE2. html#annaie1
6.4 India and Pakistan
On 11 May 1998, India conducted three nuclear device tests. Two
days later, two more tests were conducted. Several days later on May 28,
1998, Pakistan followed suit by conducting five nuclear tests. After these
tests, both countries publicly became nuclear weapon States. Before and after
these nuclear bomb tests, both India and Pakistan had their own export control
legislations and systems. Pakistan government released several export control
regulations respectively in July 1998, February 1999, and August 1999, as
well as the Export Policy and Procedures Order in November 2000. These
regulations banned the export of fissile material and required a “no objection
certificate” to be issued by the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
for the export of nuclear substances, radioactive material, and nuclear energy-
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related equipment.80 When the controversy episode of A.Q. Khan, the
Pakistan’s nuclear program architect, who secretly sold Pakistan nuclear
technologies to Iran and Libya, surfaced, it revealed the weakness and
loophole of the Pakistan export control system.
Under the pressures of the international community, especially under
the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),81 to make sure India and
Pakistan commit to non-proliferation, Pakistan’s national statute entitled
“Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to
Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004”
entered into force on September 23, 2004 while India’s “Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities)
Act, 2005” entered into force on June 6, 2005.82 The contents and structure of
80

Shi-chin Lin, The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani
Export Controls (2004) (available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_54a.html) (last
visited October 30, 2007)). For example, the older laws and administrative regulations
related export controls in Pakistan include:
Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXIX of 1950).
Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance, 1984 and
PNSRP Regulation,1990.
Statutory Notification No. SRO-782 (1)/1998 prohibits export of fissionable
materials.
Statutory Notification No.SRO-23 (1)/1999 prohibits the export of AntiPersonnel Landmines.
Statutory Notification No.SRO-124 (1)/1999 requires a No Objection
Certificate from the Defense Ministry for export of arms, ammunitions, explosives
and ingredients.
Statutory Notification No.SRO-482 (1)/2000 and SRO 111 (1)/2004. Issued by
the Ministry of Commerce lays down the Export Policy Procedures.
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance No.
LIV of 2000). This law regulates and controls the import and export of chemicals in
acordance with the provisions of CWC and provides for criminal penalties in case of
violations.
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2001. Ordinance. Under this
Ordinance, PNRA issues the required no objection certificate for import and export of
any radioactive materials or radiation sources
81
Resolution 1540 calls upon all states to implement stringent export control
laws on the transfer, shipment, re-transfer and trans-shipment of materials or
technology that may be used in the development, manufacture, and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
82
The text of India and Pakistan's export control laws can respectively be found
at http://meaindia.nic.in/disarmament/ 07da01.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc636.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2007).
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the Pakistan’s and India’s export control legislation are very similar. Both
legislations provide broad jurisdiction and authority of the central
governments over their citizens at home and abroad and foreign nationals in
their territories involving dual-use goods exports and impose criminal and
civil penalties on violators. These two legislations also established the
relevant export licensing and oversight authorities, as well as provisions for
necessary delegation of authority to officials.83
The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) under the Ministry
of Commerce is the Indian official export control agency. Its website
(http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/) does not have obvious links to Indian government’s
export control policy or licensing procedures. However, if you run “export
control” search at its website, the documents related to export controls would
be emerged. From the website of the DGFT, it can be seen that the DGFT’s
main role is to promote Indian foreign trade, especially exporting Indian
products. The trade promotion role is kind of contradictory to the function of
export controls of dual-use products and technologies.
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority is entrusted by its government
with the responsibility to ensure the physical protection measures for the
safety and security of nuclear material and radioactive sources. According to
the Export Policy Order, 2007 (SRO 1021(I)/2007) issued by the Pakistan
Ministry of Commerce, the export control license of dual-use goods is
administered by the Ministry of Commerce.84
7. Research Institutes and Advocatory Organizations
Besides the Center for International Trade and Security at the
University of Georgia and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies mentioned
above in Part One, the following institutes and organizations also engage in
research on the issues related export control and nonproliferation of WMD.
Some of the following organizations are dedicated to promote the ban of
using and trading WMD and related goods and technologies.

83

Ziad Haider & Souvik Saha, ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S EXPORT
CONTROL LAWS (available at http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20050713866) (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
84
The Export Policy Order, 2007 (SRO 1021(I)/2007) can be found at
http://www.commerce.gov.pk/SROs/1021- 08102007-EPO.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2007).
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7.1 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control was established in
1986 as a nonprofit research organization that operates in Washington, DC
and under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin. The Project is funded
by several private foundations. Its mission is to slow the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. The Project has been investigating sales of proliferationrelated technology for twenty years and has identified thousands of buyers
linked to mass destruction weapon and missile proliferation. This organization
publishes various publications on nuclear arms control and export controls of
dual-use goods. The most important one is the RISK REPORT, a searchable
database in CD-ROM format, which provides the latest unclassified
intelligence on weapons of mass destruction programs worldwide and is
updated every three weeks. The suspect buyers listed in this database are built
by experts using the reliable sources available: government reports,
manufacturers' brochures, industry databases, trade journals, and credible
media reports. Some of its publications including research papers and
testimonies before the U.S. Congress are freely available on its website at
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/.
7.2 National Academies of Sciences (NAS)
The NAS has been studying U.S. export control policies since 1982
with the support of the U.S. government. In 1987, the NAS published its first
comprehensive report on export controls which is entitled Balancing the
National Interest: U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global
Economic Competition (Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1987).
Particularly, the NAS was requested by the Congress in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 “to conduct a comprehensive study of
the adequacy of the current export administration system in safeguarding
United States' national security while maintaining United States international
competitiveness and Western technological preeminence.”85 The Academies
formed a special panel called the “Panel on the Future Design and
Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls.” In December
1990, the panel concluded a report which is entitled Finding Common
Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment
(Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1991). Besides the technology
85

50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404 Historical Note (West 1991) (Study on National
Security Export Controls).

2007]

WEI LOU

493

export control issues, the Academies also conducts the researches and
programs on nonproliferation of WMD and issues related to international
terrorism. Some of its research reports can be ordered from its website at
http://international.nationalacademies.org/gateway/international/conflict.html.
7.3 Federation of American Scientists
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was formed in 1945 by
atomic scientists from the Manhattan Project and is endorsed by dozens of
Nobel Laureates in biology, chemistry, economics, medicine and physics as
sponsors, the Federation has addressed a broad spectrum of national security
issues related to nuclear technologies and carried out its mission to promote
humanitarian uses of science and technology. Today, the Federation’s
research and education projects include nuclear arms control and global
security, conventional arms transfers, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, information technology for human health, and government
information policy. For more information about the Federation, check out its
website at http://www.fas.org/main/ home.jsp.
Since 1991, the FAS has maintained the Arms Sales Monitoring
Project (ASMP) for the transparency, accountability, and restraint in U.S.
arms exports; promoted the elimination of taxpayer subsidies for weapons
exports and the broadening the coalition of citizens working to reform arms
export policy; and increased the level of pressure on policy makers to act for
the public interest rather than the special interests of arms manufactures. For
additional information about the ASMP, check out its website at
http://fas.org/asmp/.
7.4 Nuclear Threat Initiative
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) was founded in January 2001 by
CNN founder Ted Turner and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn as a public
charity organization. NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by
reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. NTI seeks to raise public awareness, serve as a catalyst for
new thinking and take direct action to reduce these threats. In addition to Mr.
Turner and Senator Nunn, NTI is guided by an experienced and international
Board of Directors who share a common goal of taking action to reduce the
gap between the global threats and the global response. NTI actively engaged
in developing, shaping, and implementing the projects that the NTI supports
financially. In addition to building global awareness, NTI is engaged in model
programs to inspire private and governmental efforts toward threat reduction.
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NTI created its website at http://www.nti.org/ index.html to give people
access to some facts about nuclear threats.
7.5 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
Institute for Science and International Security is a non-government
organization, which is established for informing the public about science and
policy issues affecting international security. The ISIS has published
“Preventing Illegal Exports: Learning from Case Studies” and “Key Elements
of an Effective Export Control System” on its website at
http://www.exportcontrols.org/ index.html to assist those who want to
“develop and foster an export-control culture.” The contact information of the
ISIS) is 236 Massachusetts Ave NE, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 547-3633 fax: (202) 547-3634, e-mail: isis@isis-online.org.
7.6 Stimson Center
Founded in 1989, the Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security
through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach. It offers
some practical solutions to problems of national and international security. Its
endeavors include a section on export controls that provides news and
information as well as links to the Internet’s preeminent U.S. government and
non-governmental sites in support of export control and related issues at its
website (http://www.stimson.org/exportcontrol/). 1111 19th Street, NW, Suite
1200, Washington, DC 20036, 202-223-5956, info@stimson.org,
http://www.stimson.org.
7.7 Council for a Livable World
The Council for a Livable World was founded in 1962 by eminent
nuclear physicist Leo Szilard and other scientists who worked in the pioneer
days of atomic weapons. The mission of the council is to warn the public and
Congress of the threat of nuclear war and lead the way to rational arms
control and nuclear disarmament. It provides senators with sophisticated
technical and scientific information that helps them make intelligent decisions
about nuclear arms control, strategic and conventional weapons, the military
budget and United Nations peacekeeping. In 1980, the Council created the
Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation to support its mission by
providing outreach to policy-makers, opinion-shapers and voters. The contact
information of the council is: 322 4th Street, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002;
Phone: 202 543 4100, website: http://www.clw.org/.
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7.8 Center for Defense Information (CDI)
The Center for Defense Information is dedicated to strengthening
security through international cooperation, reducing reliance on unilateral
military power to resolve conflict, reducing reliance on nuclear weapons,
transforming and reforming military establishment, and monitoring spending
on defense programs. The CDI seeks to contribute alternative views on
security to promote wide-ranging discourse and debate. The CDI educates the
public and informs policy-makers about issues of security policy, strategy,
operations, weapon systems and defense budgeting, and pursues creative
solutions to the problems of today and tomorrow. The CDI is part of the
World Security Institute (http://www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/), whose
divisions include the Center for Defense Information, International Media, the
Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, Azimuth Media, and International
Programs with offices in Brussels and Moscow, and projects in China. The
contact information of the center is: 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington DC 20036-2109; phone: 202 332 6600; fax: 202 462 4559; email: info@cdi.org; website: http://www.cdi.org.
7.9 Middle Powers Initiative
The Middle Powers Initiative is a program of the Global Security
Institute. Its mission is to build bridges between governments to support the
elimination of nuclear weapons. Its campaign is guided by an International
Steering Committee, chaired by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., former
Canadian Disarmament Ambassador. Through the Middle Powers Initiative,
the following eight international non-governmental organizations are able to
work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate
the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce
nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The Initiative also publishes a series of briefs on the issue of
nonproliferation.86

86

These publications are freely available at its website
(http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs.html). Its contact information is: 675 Third
Avenue, Suite 315, New York, NY 10017, Tel: 1-646-289-5170, Fax: 1-646-2895171, Email: mpi@gsinstitute.org, and website at http://www.middlepowers.org/.
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7.10 Global Security Institute
The Global Security Institute (GSI) was founded by the United States
former Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000) from California, whose insight
that nuclear weapons are impractical, unacceptably risky, and unworthy of
civilization continues to inspire GSI's efforts to contribute to a safer world.
GSI is dedicated to strengthening international cooperation and security based
on the rule of law with a particular focus on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. GSI has developed an exceptional team that
includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats,
effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace
Laureates, disarmament and legal experts, and concerned citizens. The Global
Security Institute works through the following four results oriented programs.
1. Bipartisan Security Group: Members of Congress and their staff,
2. Disarmament & Peace Education: Citizens and leaders in the global
community,
3. Middle Powers Initiative: Heads of Government, diplomats and other
officials around the world, and
4. Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament: Legislators around
the world.
The briefs and reports produced by the GSI can be retrieved from its
website is at http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs.html.
7.11 International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
(IALANA) is an international association of lawyers working for the
elimination of nuclear arms, the strengthening of international law and the
development of effective mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. IALANA was founded in 1988 in Stockholm and has
grown into a fully-fledged international citizens' organization with
consultative status with the United Nations. IALANA has also expanded its
scope of action to include the following initiatives:
• Efforts to abolish all types of inhumane weapons and to control the
international arms trade;
• Advancing concepts of security based on the application of law and
legal mechanisms;
• Development of non-offensive defense and implementation of
confidence building measures; and
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• Encouraging the establishment and use of the International Criminal
Court and other legal procedures to address crimes against international
humanitarian law.
IALANA has four international offices: Marburg, Germany
(European Office), Wellington, Aotearoa/New Zealand (Pacific Office), New
York (United Nations Office), and Colombo, Sri Lanka (South Asia Office).
IALANA has affiliates all over the world including United States, Canada,
Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, the
Russian Federation, Norway and Italy. Its website is at http://www.ialana.net.
7.12 International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global
Responsibility
An International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global
Responsibility (INES) was founded in Berlin on November 29, 1991. The
primary aim of the Network is to encourage and facilitate international
communication among scientists and engineers seeking to promote
international peace and security, justice and sustainable development and
working for a responsible use of science and technology; and to work for the
reduction of military spending and for the transfer of resources thus liberated
to the satisfaction of basic needs. The some publications produced by the
INES can be found at its website at http://www.inesglobal.com.
7.13 International Peace Bureau
The International Peace Bureau (IPB) is dedicated to the vision of a
World Without War. Over the years thirteen of IPB officers have been
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. Their 265 member organizations in over
sixty countries, and individual members, from a global network, bring
together expertise and campaigning experience in a common cause. Their
current main program centers on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable
Development. The head quarter of the IPB is located at 41, Rue de Zurich;
CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel: 41 (22) 731 64 29; Fax: 41 (22) 738 94
19, and Website: http://www.ipb.org.
7.14 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
is the only international medical organization dedicated to preventing nuclear
war and abolishing nuclear weapons. They recognize that the catastrophic
health and environmental consequences of a nuclear war are at the extreme
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end of a continuum of armed violence that undermines health and security.
IPPNW's programs and campaigns include: International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, An International Campaign to Prevent Small Arms
Violence, and Medical Student Leadership Development.
IPPNW is a non-partisan federation of national medical organizations
in sixty countries, representing tens of thousands of doctors, medical students,
other health workers, and concerned citizens who share the common goal of
creating a more peaceful and secure world freed from the threat of nuclear
annihilation. IPPNW Central Office is located at 727 Massachusetts Ave.,
Cambridge, MA 02139, Telephone: (617) 868-5050, Fax: (617) 868-2560,
and its website is at http://www.ippnw.org.
7.15 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation initiates and supports worldwide
efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, to strengthen the role of international law
and institutions, and to inspire and empower a new generation of peace
leaders. Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and
organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear
Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-profit, non-partisan
international education and advocacy organization. It has consultative status
to the United Nations Economic and Social Council and is recognized by the
UN as a Peace Messenger Organization. Its Washington D.C. Office is
located at 322 Fourth Street NE, Washington, DC 20002, Telephone: (202)
543-4100, ext 105, Fax: (202) 546-5142; and its website is at
http://www.wagingpeace.org.
7.16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
The SIPRI’s mission on export controls and nonproliferation includes
raising the quality of information and awareness of the current state of
national and multilateral export control systems in Europe. The SIPRI offers
insights in to national arms export controls, multilateral export control
regimes, and international organizations providing support to control efforts
through its numerous publications and databases. Some of its publications and
databases are freely available on its website at
http://www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/publications. The contact
information of the institute is: Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden,
Phone: 46-8-655-97-00; fax: 46-8-655 97 33; e-mail: sipri@sipri.org; and
website: http://projects.sipri.se/.

